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In this paper Kashima et al. develop an inter-
esting model of self that attempts to simulate sev-
eral psychological processes critical to an amalga-
mated James-Mead theoretical conceptualization of
self. More speciﬁcally, the authors use a connectionist
framework to model temporal, cultural and social as-
pects of self which may give rise to the enculturated
stream of consciousness which is seen the essential
experience of self in such a model. This approach is
important as so much of behavioral research has fo-
cused on the self as known, in relatively static form, in
contrasttothedynamicaspectsoftheselfthatunfoldin
eachmomentandasafunctionofcontext.Simpleasso-
ciative and declarative models of self-representations
arenotwellequippedtohandlethesenonlineardynam-
ics, but connectionist models excel at capturing such
dynamics (Hopﬁeld, 1982).
Although the authors are primarily interested in us-
ingconnectionismasatooltomodelartiﬁcialneuralar-
chitecture that is capable of supporting self-processes,
they also stress that such models should be biologi-
cally plausible at the neural level. An interest in how
the self is neurally instantiated in the living human
brain has been investigated in recent years by a grow-
ing number of social neuroscientists, who have used
functional imaging techniques to attempt to isolate the
neural correlates of self-processing. Although the ef-
fort to understand how the self is represented in the
brain is still in its infancy, such investigations have
nonetheless already proven informative and seem well
worthreviewinghere.Duetotheinherentcomplexities
of discussing a phenomena as multifaceted as the self,
it may be useful to consider this body of research by
parsing it into the follow categories: self-processing
versus other social processing, internally-focused ver-
sus externally-focused self-processing, and controlled
versus automatic aspects of self-processing.
Self Versus Social Processing
An unresolved question in social psychology is the
degree to which the self is a unique knowledge struc-
ture whose characteristics differ qualitatively from
other kinds of mental representations. This debate was
partly sparked by the discoveries that information is
betterrememberedwhenencodedwithreferencetothe
self (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) and when it is
judged to be self-descriptive (Derry & Kuiper, 1981).
While some researchers have suggested that these
ﬁndings constitute evidence for the unique nature of
self-representations (Rogers et al., 1977), others have
argued that self-reference effects can be explained
by the operation of ordinary memory processes such
as elaboration and depth of encoding (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1989). In a more recent meta-analysis, it was
found that the memory advantage of self-reference is
diminished but not eliminated when it is compared to
conditions in which participants encode information
with reference to another individual, particularly if the
target is well-known (Symons & Johnson, 1997).
The advent of functional imaging has afforded re-
searchers a new tool for investigating whether the self
is represented uniquely in the brain. One manner of
addressing this question is to examine whether brain
regions that are recruited by self-processing are dis-
tinct from those which are involved in the process-
ing of other similar social information. These studies
have generally employed paradigms in which the self-
processing condition consists of participants making
self-reﬂective judgments about whether trait words or
sentences are self-descriptive or not. Brain activation
in response to this condition is then compared to ac-
tivation generated by comparable judgments of other
individuals and/or semantic tasks such as judging the
letter case of a trait adjective.
A clear, robust ﬁnding that has emerged from this
line of research is that cortical midline structures
are consistently engaged when subjects are asked to
make judgments about their own psychological pro-
cesses, especially when compared to semantic pro-
cessing (Northoff et al., 2006). In particular, medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) appears to be heavily re-
cruited during self-reﬂective processing. In one of
the ﬁrst fMRI studies to directly examine the neural
correlates of self-reﬂection (rather than the monitor-
ing of internal states), Johnson and colleagues (2002)
found activation in anterior MPFC (BA 9/10) when
comparing self-reﬂective judgments (e.g., “I am a
good friend”) to semantic knowledge processing (e.g.,
“You need water to live”). Recruitment of MPFC for
self-judgments compared to semantic judgments has
since been well replicated (D’Argembeau et al., 2005;
Fossati et al., 2003; Heatherton et al., 2006; Johnson
et al., 2005; Kelley et al., 2002; Phan et al., 2004;
Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004; Zysset,
Huber, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2002). The degree of
self-relevance of the target stimuli may be an impor-
tant moderator of this effect, as MPFC has been shown
to activate more strongly to material judged to be self-
descriptive than material deemed non-self-descriptive
(Macrae,Moran,Heatherton,Banﬁeld,&Kelley,2004;
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Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006).
In contrast, stimulus valence does not appear to be
a signiﬁcant moderator of MPFC activation induced
by self-processing, in that MPFC has been shown to
be recruited similarly for self-referentially process-
ing both negative and positive stimuli (Moran et al.,
2006).
Furthermore, MPFC involvement during self-
processing may be responsible for the previously
described memory advantage observed for self-
referenced stimuli. In a speciﬁc investigation of the
neural correlates of the self-reference effect, MPFC
activation in response to judging trait adjectives was
shown to predict subsequent memory for the material
(Macrae et al., 2004). This ﬁnding prompted investiga-
tors to suggest that MPFC may facilitate the encoding
intomemoryofself-relevantmaterialinmuchthesame
way that the amygdala is thought to enhance the en-
coding of emotional stimuli. A study by Fossati and
colleagues (2004) dovetails nicely with this ﬁnding by
demonstrating selective MPFC activation during re-
trieval of adjectives that had been previously encoded
with reference to the self compared to those which had
been encoded semantically or phonemically.
Although the ubiquitous involvement of MPFC
in self-reﬂective processing seems clear, it is much
less obvious whether MPFC (or a speciﬁc region of
MPFC)isselectivelyactivatedforself-judgments.Sev-
eral studies have found essentially no differences be-
tweenneuralactivityinresponsetotraitself-judgments
andtraitjudgmentsofothers,includingbothpersonally
unknown and close others (Craik, 1999; Ochsner et al.,
2005; Schmitz et al., 2004; Seger, Stone, & Keenan,
2004). However, other studies which compare these
same conditions evidence greater activation of MPFC
during self-processing compared to other-processing
(D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Heatherton et al., 2006;
Kelley et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004). In a recent
developmental study, Pﬁefer and colleagues (under re-
view)foundthatinbothchildrenandadultsMPFCwas
more active when judging the descriptiveness of traits
for the self versus a familiar other.
The existing literature suggests several possible
ways of understanding how self-processing and other
social processing may occur in the brain. The ﬁrst pos-
sibility is that MPFC is generally recruited to the same
extent whenever metacognitive evaluation of social in-
formation is required, be it about the self or another
individual. This would suggest that there is little neu-
ral difference between the processes used to psycho-
logically evaluate oneself or another individual (Bem,
1967). A second possibility is that both self-and other-
reﬂectionevokeMPFCactivitybuttoadifferentextent,
which would imply that differences between these two
kinds of processing are indexed quantitatively in the
brain. A third possibility is that there are functionally
discrete areas of MPFC that make dissociable contri-
butions to self-and other-processing in the brain. Such
a model implies that there are qualitative differences
in how the two processes are neurally instantiated.
The latter possibility seems to be most fruitfully
informed by examining the potentially separable con-
tributions of ventral and dorsal regions of MPFC to
self-processing. In general, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) has been linked to emotion and af-
fective processing while dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(DMPFC) has been associated with cognitive opera-
tions and executive function (Stuss & Levine, 2002).
Phillips and colleagues (2003) have proposed a model
that mapped appraisal theories of emotion perception
onto distinct ventral and dorsal neural circuitry. The
authors suggest that a ventral affective system (con-
sisting of ventral prefrontal cortex, amygdala, insula,
ventral striatum, and ventral anterior cingulate gyrus)
may be important for identifying the emotional im-
port of stimuli and producing appropriate affective re-
sponses. In contrast, the dorsal neurocognitive system
(made up of dorsal prefrontal regions, dorsal ante-
rior cingulate, and hippocampus) is involved in the
regulation of the affective response produced by the
ventral route. Northoff and Bermpohl (2004) recently
proposed an analogous model which is speciﬁc for
self-processing. In this model, VMPFC continuously
represents self-referential material and DMPFC sub-
sequently evaluates the representations generated by
VMPFC. In related work, Schmitz and Johnson (2005)
found that self-processing activated both ventral and
dorsal MPFC when compared to making decisions
about target valence. However, when the investigators
conducted connectivity analyses of MPFC activation,
they found VMPFC was coupled to amygdala, insula
and nucleus accumbens activity, while DMPFC activ-
ity was coupled to dorsolateral PFC and hippocampus.
The authors interpret these ﬁndings to mean that the
ventral route is responsible for generating the affective
experience of self-related processes, while the dorsal
routecontributestothecognitiveevaluationofthestim-
uli under consideration. To the extent that the self is
a more intrinsically affect-laden structure than knowl-
edge about others persons, it may turn out to be the
case that self-processing could preferentially recruit
more ventral regions of MPFC while other-processing
could evoke stronger dorsal MPFC activity.
In a slightly different approach, Mitchell and
colleagues (2006) have argued that self-processing
generally recruits VMPFC rather than DMPFC, but
that mentalizing about others may differentially
involve either VMPFC or DMPFC depending upon
the situational context. The authors propose that the
neural networks involved in thinking about the minds
of others will depend upon the extent to which using
the self as a template for understanding others is
situationally appropriate. That is, the self may be a
useful model only if the other under consideration is
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very similar to oneself. In support of this hypothesis,
the authors observed a double dissociation in which
making judgments about the self and similar others
commonly activated VMPFC but making judgments
about dissimilar others selectively activated DMPFC.
It is interesting to note that in some ways this the-
ory is the converse of that proposed by Kashima et al.:
one model suggests that the self is created through ap-
propriating the experiences of others, while the other
argues that the we use our own experiences as a vehi-
cle for understanding the minds of others. Other data
are supportive of the target article’s view. In the study
by Pfeifer et al. (under review), adults were found
to activate DMPFC more when making social judg-
ments about another person than when making self-
referential judgments (for which VMPFC was more
active). In contrast, the young children in the study ac-
tivated DMPFC during both social and self-referential
judgments. These ﬁndings may suggest that prior to
have well-established self-knowledge, children may
relymoreonsocialknowledgeprocesseswhenmaking
self-judgments than they do later in life.
Internal Versus External Self-Focus
Although we have thus far limited our discussion
of the neural correlates of self-processing to MPFC, it
is important to note that posterior midline structures
such as posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortex, and
precuneus are also frequently activated in response
to self-processing (Northoff et al., 2006). This co-
activation has prompted some investigators to suggest
that cortical midline structures may be diffusely in-
volved in self-representation and can even be thought
of as a single functional unit (Northoff & Bermpohl,
2004).
Lieberman (2006) recently reviewed evidence
which suggests that this remarkably robust pattern of
midline activity may have less to do with the target
of mental processes per se (e.g., self versus other) but
rather may depend more critically upon the aspect of
the target being considered. In this review, Lieberman
argues that we usually think about ourselves and
others in one of two general ways and that each may
be distinctly represented in the brain. The ﬁrst way is
termed internally-focused. In this mode, attention is
directed to intangible aspects of the self or others, such
as thoughts, feelings or other contents of the mind. In
contrast, externally-focused refers to when the target
under consideration is viewed as a physical object
in the world whose characteristics are available to us
through sensory-mediated channels. It is important
to recognize that it is the nature of the goal of the
perceiver that determines processing mode rather than
an intrinsic property of the stimulus. It is likely that
we adaptively switch processing modes ﬂexibly and
without conscious awareness in accord with situa-
tional demands. For example, asking an individual
to judge whether a target is an honest person will
prompt internally-focused processing, whereas asking
whether the same target is overweight will initiate
externally-focused processing.
Existing neuroimaging data suggests that medial
frontoparietal structures in the brain are engaged when
an internal focus is adopted and lateral frontoparietal
areas are involved in externally-focused processing.
The studies reviewed above support the assertion that
midline structures are important for internal focus as
theyhavegenerallyaskedparticipantstoadoptthisper-
spective by making trait judgments of themselves. In
contrast, tasks such as self-recognition generate lateral
activations,butnotmedialactivations,intheprefrontal
and parietal cortices when individuals identify them-
selves in pictures (Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs,
Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2005). Similarly, investigations
of agency (the sense of being responsible for one’s
ownbodilymovements)generallyﬁndthatlateralpari-
etal cortex (LPAC) is involved in detecting a mismatch
between visual and proprioceptive information about
one’s own body (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith,
2002; Leube, Knoblich, Erb, & Kircher, 2003; Mac-
Donald & Paus, 2003; Shimada, Hiraki, & Oda, 2005).
This distinction suggests that in attempting to map
the neural processes that underlie the self, future in-
vestigations should consider the extent to which tasks
encourage a speciﬁc kind of focus to be adopted. This
distinctionalsoremindsusofthemultifacetednatureof
representations such as the self and that fact that there
is probably no one speciﬁc “self” area of the brain.
Rather, many component processes work together and
under different circumstances to generate our sense of
self.
Dual-Process Models and the Self
One can view much of the research on the self
through the lens of dual-process models, which gener-
ally posit the existence of two processing modes that
can be described as controlled and automatic. Con-
trolled processes are intentional, operate sequentially,
feel effortful, can be interrupted and are available
to awareness (Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Automatic
processes, on the other hand, lack at least one and
preferably all of these qualities. Neurocognitive
systems have been identiﬁed that roughly map on
to these two modes of psychological processing
(Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002).
The X-system (named after the x in reﬂexive) is
thought to be roughly equivalent to an automatic so-
cialcognitionnetworkinthebrain.ItincludesVMPFC,
amygdala, basal ganglia, lateral temporal cortex (LTC)
and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). The
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X-system processes information in parallel, learns
slowly, does not require cognitive resources, and op-
erates quickly and without reﬂective awareness. It is
responsibleforthecreationofourstreamofconscious-
ness and representing our statistical generalizations
about the world.
Conversely, the C-system (after the c in reﬂective)
is thought to roughly correspond to a controlled social
cognition network in the brain and includes MPFC,
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), lateral parietal cortex
(LPAC), medial parietal cortex (MPAC), medial tem-
poral lobe (MTL), and rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex (rACC). In contrast to the X-system, the C-system
processes information serially, learns quickly, operates
slowlyandwithconsciousreﬂection,andrequirescog-
nitiveresources.TheC-systemappearstobeimportant
for processing exceptions or symbolic problems that
cannot easily be handled by the X-system.
In a recent investigation, Lieberman, Jarcho, and
Satpute (2004) attempted to parse out how these dual
processes may operate in the brain with respect to
self-knowledge. Speciﬁcally, they hypothesized the
existenceoftwosystems,whichtheytermedevidence-
based and intuition-based self-knowledge. Evidence-
based self-knowledge refers to the conscious, reﬂec-
tive processes that are enacted when an individual
processes information in a low-experience domain.
This kind of controlled processing is likely to engage
C-system structures, as it will require conscious reﬂec-
tion and retrieval of episodic memories. In contrast,
intuition-based self-knowledge is involved in access-
ingknowledgeinhigh-experiencedomains.Assuch,it
is a nonreﬂective, automatic way of knowing about the
self that should therefore operate via X-system neu-
rocognitive structures.
In this fMRI study, individuals who were either
highly experienced soccer players or actors judged
whether traits related to soccer or acting were self-
descriptive. In line with their hypotheses, the au-
thors found that processing information in one’s high-
experience domain (e.g., actors judging acting words)
activated X-system structures. In contrast, processing
information in one’s low-experience domain (e.g. ac-
tors judging soccer words) selectively activated com-
ponents of the C-system. Thus, it appears that as one
gains experience within a domain, the neural struc-
tures that subserve its representation may move from
brain regions that are associated with conscious con-
trol to those which are more automatic and affective.
This change in neural circuitry makes intuitive sense
because as one gains experience in a particular do-
main, processing information relevant to that domain
is no longer an exception or special symbolic problem
related to the self (province of the C-system) but has
been incorporated into a generalized schema about the
self (the domain of the X-system).
This research also highlights the notion that self-
processes are diverse and contain both automatic and
controlled components. In particular, there may be an
important distinction between self-reﬂection and self-
knowledge activation. In another recent study, Pﬁefer,
Lieberman, and Dapretto (under review) suggest that
MPFC may be involved in self-reﬂection but not in ac-
cessing stored self-knowledge. The authors observed
that during self-knowledge retrieval adults show less
MPFC activation relative to children. This implies that
MPFC is not a storage site for self-knowledge, as
adults have presumably accumulated greater stores of
knowledge about the self than children. Thus, MPFC
may be important for the process of self-reﬂection
rather than responsible for the actual representation of
self-knowledge.
In ongoing research, we have been interested in the
way in which X-system processing of schematic in-
formation may contribute to such information being
more strongly encoded into memory. A schematic do-
main is one that is considered to be both highly de-
scriptive and highly important to an individual’s self-
concept (Markus, 1977). Building upon the original
work by Markus, we have found that even when biased
responding and self-reference effects are controlled
for, individuals who hold a self-schema in a particular
domain remember schema-relevant information better
than non-schematic material (Rameson & Lieberman,
in prep). We think that this deeper encoding may result
from X-system processing of schematic information,
sothatsuchmaterialisencodedinamoreaffectiveand
memorable manner.
In a recent fMRI pilot study, participants with vary-
ing levels of athletic schematicity viewed a series of
neutral athletic and academic (control) pictures and
judged whether each picture contained people or not.
Thirty minutes later, participants were given a surprise
memorytestfortheimagesthatincludedanequalnum-
ber of new athletic and academic pictures. Replicating
earlier work in our lab, we found that higher levels of
athletic schematicity were associated with greater ac-
tivity in the amygdala and nucleus accumbens while
judging whether athletic traits were self-descriptive or
not. Moreover, activations in these regions during ath-
letic trait judgments were also correlated with mem-
ory performance for athletic pictures. Thus, brain ac-
tivity during trait judgment may be a sort of neural
index of schematicity, which can be used to predict
memoryperformance.Thismaysuggestthatamygdala
and nucleus accumbens are critical mediators of the
relationship between possession of a self-schema and
enhanced recall for information within the schematic
domain.
Past research has made it clear that emotional ma-
terial is better remembered than non-emotional infor-
mation at least partly through activation of X-system
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structuresliketheamygdala(McGaugh,2004),butour
research extends these ﬁndings in suggesting that va-
lence need not be a latent property of the stimulus. In
thisstudy,althoughthetargetstimuliwereallpre-rated
and selected to be neutral, a property of the individual
(the self-schema) may have caused the “neutral” infor-
mation to be processed affectively. In turn, this affec-
tive processing seems to responsible for causing the
information to be better remembered than information
which was not related to one’s self-schema.
Dual Processing and Connectionism
After reviewing evidence that the self has both au-
tomatic and controlled components that are processed
distinctly in the brain, it is not clear that all self-
processesareequallyamenabletobeingmodeledusing
connectionism. Two questions in particular seem rele-
vant. First, what kinds of processes are best modeled
using connectionist theory? Second, to the extent that
one wishes to construct a neuroanatomically plausi-
ble connectionist model, what neurocognitive systems
might be the best candidates for performing connec-
tionist processing?
Connectionist models are characterized by pos-
sessing subsymbolic, parallel processing architectures
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Smolensky, 1988).
By subsymbolic we mean that an individual node in
the connectionist network should not represent a sym-
bolic construct like “dog” or “sad.” Rather, represen-
tations in connectionist networks are achieved only
by matching particular patterns of activation among
the various nodes. By parallel processing, we mean
simply that the operations of the network are car-
ried out simultaneously rather than sequentially. This
characterization, albeit brief and oversimpliﬁed, im-
mediately suggests that connectionist networks may
be more appropriate for modeling automatic, parallel
processes rather than controlled, sequential processes
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).
As previously discussed, automatic processes are
largely underwritten by the X-system, which per-
forms subsymbolic, pattern-matching, parallel pro-
cessingwithoutconsciousawareness(Liebermanetal.,
2002). In contrast, hallmarks of the C-system are se-
rial processing, use of symbolic logic, and the sense
of agency that occurs with its instantiation. It is im-
portant to recognize that automatic processes are not
just faster, more efﬁcient versions of controlled pro-
cesses. Although at times these processes look similar
and produce similar outputs, their qualitative differ-
encesareevidencedbytheirdifferentialengagementof
the neurocognitive systems that underwrite their func-
tions. For example, implicit pattern learning is associ-
ated with X-system inferior temporal cortex activation
(Aizenstein et al., 2000). However, when individuals
are given explicit instructions to ﬁnd patterns, PFC
and hippocampus (C-system structures) are activated
instead. Analogously, similarity-based pattern match-
ing activates LTC but rule-based processing of similar
problems results in prefrontal, anterior cingulate and
hippocampus activations (Houde et al., 2000). Thus,
even when both the X-and C-systems are capable of
completing identical tasks, the mode of processing
(pattern matching versus symbolic logic) remain fun-
damentally distinct.
Therefore, we submit that connectionist models
may best describe processes that are automatic and
processed in parallel. Furthermore, for connectionist
models that strive to be biologically feasible, sensi-
tivity to the processing constraints of the neurocogni-
tive candidates involved in the model seems critical.
Because the X-system shares many of the operating
characteristics of connectionist models, namely paral-
lel processing and subsymbolic pattern matching, we
suggest that this neurocognitive system is an ideal can-
didate for connectionist models.
Note
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